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Changing Institutions in the European Market:
the Impact on Mark-ups and Rents Allocation
Antonio Bassanetti, Roberto Torrini, Francesco Zollino
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1 Banca d’Italia. 
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether the completion of the Single Market Programme has 
enhanced  competition  on  the  product  markets  across European  countries,  while  taking into 
account the companion structural reforms undertaken by the member countries. In particular, 
since the Single Market Programme went hand in hand with major reforms in the labour market 
and in the institutional setting of important industries (i.e. network industries), we test for a break 
in  both  mark-ups  and  the  division  of  rent  between  capital and  labour.  For  this  purpose  we 
encompass efficient bargaining in the labour market in both our theoretical and empirical model. 
Using industry data for ten EU countries we find that, without controlling for changes in the rent 
sharing, mark-up estimates tend to increase in the 1990s. However, once we assume efficient 
bargaining  in  the  labour  market,  mark-ups remain  virtually  unchanged  or  even  decrease  in 
some  sectors  or  groups  of  countries;  the result  stems  from  the  declining  shares  of  rents 
accruing to workers owing to a decline in their bargaining power. Without controlling for this 
development, a rise in firms’ profitability due to rent reallocation could be wrongly interpreted as 
an increase in market power. At the industry level the evidence is particularly strong for high 
and medium-tech manufacturing, for construction and for those activities that went through deep 
institutional changes and privatization programmes.
JEL Classification: J50, L50
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Since the early nineties, economies in the European Union (EU) have gone through deep structural
changes driven by widespread institutional reforms and the evolution of the international context.
The implementation of the Single Market Programme and several EU directives on network in-
dustries and other highly regulated activities reshaped goods and service markets in an e⁄ort to
enhance competition while reforms at the country level greatly increased labour market ￿ exibility.
At the same time, the surge of new competitors at global level added to the competitive pressures
on European ￿rms and necessitated an intense reorganization of their production processes.
A large body of research has investigated the actual impact of these trends across EU countries.
In particular, following the approaches to mark-up estimation put forward by Hall (1988) and
Roger (1995), recent contributions have focused on detecting the pro-competitive impact of the
Single Market Programme. However, most studies are limited to the manufacturing sector and
do not come up with clear-cut evidence of declining market power (Allen et al., 1998; Bottasso
and Sembenelli, 2001; Sauner-Leroy, 2003; Gri¢ th et al., 2010). Badinger (2007) even ￿nds an
unexpected increase in mark-ups in most service activities.
Unfortunately, this literature disregards the contemporaneous labour market reforms, which
enhanced ￿ exibility and job-creation in the EU and are deemed to account for a large share of
the employment increase since the mid-1990s (European Commission, 2004; Bassanini and Duval,
2006; Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008). Developments in the labour markets likely reduced the
unions￿bargaining power, leading to a decline of rents accrued to workers and thus explaining part
of the fall in the labour share of total value added observed in most European countries (Blanchard,
1997 and 2000; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).2 Controlling for these trends is particularly relevant
for mark-up estimation; otherwise, a rise in ￿rms￿pro￿tability due to rent redistribution could be
wrongly interpreted as an increase in market power, even though the overall amount of rents is
declining thanks to stronger product market competition.
In the empirical literature on mark-up estimation the issue of simultaneous imperfections on
the product and the labour markets has been addressed only in a few recent contributions, which
1We are grateful for comments and suggestions received on an earlier version of the paper by participants in
the EU KLEMS ￿nal conference on "Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach"
at the University of Groningen, the European Economic Association conference at the Barcelona Graduate School
of Economics, the European Association of Labour Economists at the University College London, the seminars
in the Bank of Italy and the European Commission. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors
and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. Correspondence to: antonio.bassanetti@bancaditalia.it;
roberto.torrini@bancaditalia.it and francesco.zollino@bancaditalia.it.
2Additionally, the privatization of public ￿rms shifted management incentives towards increasing the shareholder
values (Torrini, 2005; Azmat et al., 2007). This factor proved particularly strong in network utilities.
2embed e¢ cient bargaining between ￿rms and unions within the standard approach set out by Hall
(Bughin, 1996; CrØpon et al., 2002; Neven et al., 2002; Dobbelaere, 2004; Dobbelaere and Mairesse,
2007). They show that mark-up estimates tend to be downward biased when the rent allocation
is not explicitly taken into account.
We move from this strand of literature to investigate to what extent the changes in the unions￿
power can a⁄ect the assessment of the break in mark-ups expected from the completion of the
Single Market Programme. In particular, the aim of the paper is to provide estimates of the
evolution of mark-ups in Europe since the nineties, by taking explicitly into account the e⁄ects of
changes in the division of rent between labour and capital inputs. For this purpose, we embed the
e¢ cient bargaining model within the dual approach put forward by Roeger (1995), which makes
it possible to get consistent OLS estimates of key parameters and to work with current price
variables, thus avoiding the bias caused by errors in the measurement of volumes.
We provide estimates at both the aggregate and the industry level by exploiting the EU KLEMS
dataset covering the whole business sector, including such highly regulated industries as energy,
telecommunications and ￿nance, which have recently gone through major institutional changes.
We concentrate on a set of countries broadly representing the European Union, though we also
provide results for the subset of those belonging to the euro area and for clusters of countries
de￿ned by the intensity of the regulatory changes.
Among our main ￿ndings, we show that without controlling for changes in rent sharing, mark-
up estimates tend to increase in the 1990s. However, once we assume e¢ cient bargaining in the
labour market, mark-ups remain virtually unchanged or even decrease in some sectors or groups
of countries; this result stems from the declining shares of rents accruing to workers due to a fall
in their bargaining power.
In the remaining part of the paper, we ￿rst sketch the model and discuss our paper￿ s links
to the received literature. After a description of the dataset, we comment on our main empirical
￿ndings and conclude with some ￿nal observations.
2 The model and the links to the literature
In this section we sketch the model adopted for the estimation of mark-ups and rent sharing
between capital and labour. In the literature two approaches are usually followed for mark-up
estimation, both relying on the assumption that employment levels are determined by the labour
demand schedule: the seminal model developed by Hall (1988), which starts out from the solution
of the primal optimization problem of the ￿rm, and the one put forward by Roeger (1995) which
3combines the primal and the dual solutions. In particular, by computing a suitable measure of
the user cost of capital, Roeger provides a strategy to get rid of the unobservable TFP term that
poses serious problems for the empirical implementation of Hall￿ s approach.
Hall￿ s approach has recently been extended to the case that ￿rms and workers divide rents
according to e¢ cient bargaining on both wages and labour input (Dobbelaere, 2004). Indeed,
the e¢ cient bargaining model has been receiving renewed attention in the literature addressing
the recent decline in the labour share of total value added across most industrial countries, since
in such a model the institutional changes a⁄ecting bargaining power can explain part of that
reduction (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Torrini, 2005; Azmat et al., 2007). This feature also
proves relevant for mark-up estimation, as Hall￿ s and Roeger￿ s standard approaches both su⁄er
from misspeci￿cation when rents are shared according to e¢ cient bargaining. In fact, the observed
wage rate absorbs part of the rents that ￿rms are able to elicit in the product market, so that
the observed price-cost margin underestimates the overall amount of rents and thus the market
power of ￿rms. Instead the relevant margin to detect the actual market power of ￿rms (the Lerner
index) should be measured with respect to the reservation wage of workers. Since both Hall￿ s and
Roeger￿ s original models look at the wedge between the price and the observed wage rate, any rise
(fall) in the price-cost margin due to a decrease (increase) in the workers￿rent share is wrongly
interpreted as a rise (fall) in the market power of ￿rms. We consider this a major drawback of the
standard models when applied to assess the evolution of the ￿rms￿market power in Europe during
the nineties, since the labour market went through important structural changes that probably
a⁄ected the bargaining power of unions.
In what follows, after sketching the standard approaches to mark-up estimation and the ex-
tension put forward by Dobbelaere to include e¢ cient bargaining in Hall￿ s model, we show how
e¢ cient bargaining can also be embedded in Roeger￿ s. This provides us with a new model to
be estimated, whose results can be compared with the evidence found by Badinger (2007), who
applied Roeger￿ s standard approach to study the changes in mark-ups following the completion of
the Single Market Programme.
The standard models. Hall￿ s empirical strategy to estimate price mark-ups on marginal costs
can be seen as a rearrangement of the Solow residual, once the assumption of perfect competition
on the product markets is removed. The basic equation in growth accounting is the following:3
￿q = "Q;N￿n + "Q;M￿m + "Q;K￿k + ￿e (1)
3Time subscripts are dropped for simplicity￿ s sake.
4where q is the log of gross output, n is the log of labour input, m is the log of intermediate inputs,
k is the log of capital input, ￿e is technical progress, and the parameters "Q;f (f = N; M; K)
represent output elasticities with respect to labour, intermediate and capital inputs. Under the
assumptions of perfect competition on both output and input markets and of constant returns
to scale, the output elasticities are just the input shares of total output. Hall showed that with
imperfect competition on the output market, these elasticities are given by the product of input
shares and the mark-up, so that equation (1) can be rewritten as follows (details in Appendix I):
￿q = ￿￿N￿n + ￿￿M￿m + ￿￿K￿k + ￿e (2)
where ￿f are the input shares of output (f = N; M; K) and the mark-up ￿ is de￿ned as the ratio
of the output price to marginal cost.
Assuming constant returns to scale, equation (2) can be rearranged to obtain:
￿q = ￿￿N￿n + ￿￿M￿m + (1 ￿ ￿￿N ￿ ￿￿M)￿k + ￿e (3)
and de￿ning ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ B), it follows that
￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k = B(￿q ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ B)￿e (4)
which in the right-hand side gives a decomposition of the standard Solow residual shown in the
left-hand side.
This equation can be estimated to retrieve B and therefore ￿. However, given that the e¢ ciency
term (1￿B)￿e is not observed, instrumental variables are required to obtain consistent estimates.
Roeger (1995) worked out an ingenious way to get rid of the unobservable e¢ ciency term, by
combining the primal and the dual solution to the ￿rm￿ s program. He showed that the following
equations holds (see Appendix I for the derivation):
(￿q + ￿p) ￿ ￿N (￿n + ￿w) ￿ ￿M (￿m + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)(￿k + ￿r)
= B[(￿q + ￿p) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] (5)
where (￿q + ￿p), (￿n + ￿w), (￿m + ￿j) and (￿k + ￿r) represent, respectively, the growth rate
of nominal output and input compensation (p; w; j; r being the logs of output and input prices).
The term on the left-hand side can be de￿ned as the nominal Solow residual (NSR), which only
depends on the changes in the revenue-capital ratio expressed in nominal terms. Unlike Hall￿ s
model, which requires instrumental variables, this equation can be estimated simply through OLS.
5Moreover, once a suitable user cost of capital r is computed, it only includes nominal variables
and it is not a⁄ected by possible biases in the measurement of input and output de￿ ators.
The e¢ cient bargaining model. A number of recent contributions (Dobbelaere, 2004; Dobbe-
laere and Mairesse, 2008; CrØpon et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2009) have modi￿ed Hall￿ s model
by introducing the hypothesis that ￿rms and unions bargain over labour input and wages in order
to share existing rents. In this setting both the labour share and the elasticity of output to labour
input become a function of the bargaining power of unions (see Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003),
whose estimate is thus needed (together with that of the mark-up ￿) in order to retrieve the correct
value of the output elasticity.4
More speci￿cally, following Dobbelaere (2004) and Abraham et al. (2009) it is assumed that
￿rms and workers, while taking the other factors of production as given, choose W and N by















where W is the reservation wage, N is trade union membership, R is the ￿rm￿ s revenue; ￿ is the
unions￿bargaining power.
The ￿rst order condition for N leads to:
W = RN + ￿
R ￿ RNN
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This condition shows the well-known result that under e¢ cient bargaining ￿rms and workers
set wages at a level equal to a weighted average of the marginal and the mean revenue of labour,
de￿ning a pair of W and N on the contract curve (point B in Figure 1), which lies above the
labour demand (marginal revenue). Moreover, with risk-neutral unions, as assumed in (6), the
contract curve describing the set of possible solutions to the maximization program is vertical and
production is set at the e¢ cient level which makes the marginal revenue equal to the opportunity
cost of labour (the reservation wage; point A in Figure 1):
4With e¢ cient bargaining the employment level does not lie on labour demand and no longer re￿ ects the marginal
revenue of labour contrary to other models, like the ￿ right to manage￿or ￿ the monopoly union￿, where the labour
input decision is left to the ￿rm for given wages.










Figure 1 - E¢ cient bargaining solution
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Accordingly, under e¢ cient bargaining the price strategy of ￿rms depends on the reservation
wage W, so that the relevant price-cost margin measuring ￿rms￿market power has to be computed
with respect to the reservation wage instead of the observed wage W: This correctly measures the
overall rent to be shared, which is not a⁄ected by changes in the bargaining power of unions.
Hall￿ s and Roeger￿ s models with e¢ cient bargaining. Hall￿ s model can be adjusted by plugging





















@N = "Q;N, we get:




and the elasticity of output to labour turns out to be a function of the labour share, the mark-up
and union bargaining power:
"Q;N = ￿￿N + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(￿N ￿ 1) (11)
Thus with e¢ cient bargaining and assuming constant returns to scale, the whole set of output












By de￿ning ￿ =
￿
1￿￿ and substituting for output elasticities (12) in equation (1), Dobbelaere
(2004) and Abraham et al. (2009) obtained a modi￿ed version of Hall￿ s equation:
￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k
= B(￿q ￿ ￿k) + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)(￿n ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ B)￿e (13)
where an extra term ￿(￿N ￿1)(￿n￿￿k) shows up. Omitting this additional term would lead to
biased estimates of both B and the mark-up ￿:
Following the same approach, we modi￿ed Roeger￿ s model to obtain (see Appendix I for the
derivation):
(￿q + ￿p) ￿ ￿N(￿n + ￿w) ￿ ￿M(￿m + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)(￿k + ￿r)
= B[(￿q + ￿p) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)[(￿n + ￿w) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] (14)
While controlling for the extra term ￿(￿N ￿ 1)(￿n ￿ ￿k), we can estimate this equation by
OLS, bene￿ting from the advantages of Roeger￿ s original approach.
5It should be noticed that in the ￿ right to manage￿or in the ￿ monopoly union￿model, where employment is
chosen by ￿rms on the labour demand, the usual ￿rst order condition for pro￿t maximization RN = W continues
to hold true, although W is no longer set at the competitive level. In this case Hall￿ s results would not be modi￿ed,
as the elasticity of output with respect to labour would remain "Q;N = ￿￿N; moreover, the bargaining power of
workers would not show up in the equation to be estimated and therefore would not a⁄ect the estimation of the
mark-up either.
8More speci￿cally, our empirical model is given by:
NSRi;t = ￿0 + ￿1XMARKi;t + ￿2V BARGi;t + ui;t (15)
where, by dropping subscripts: NSR = [(￿q + ￿p) ￿ ￿N(￿n + ￿w) ￿ ￿M(￿m + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿
￿N ￿ ￿M)(￿k + ￿r)] is the nominal Solow residual; XMARK = [(￿q + ￿p) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] is the
nominal change in the output to capital ratio, whose coe¢ cient is linked to the mark-up through
the equation ￿ = 1=(1￿￿1); V BARG = (￿N ￿1)[(￿n+￿w)￿(￿k+￿r)] is the weighted nominal
change in the labour to capital ratio and its coe¢ cient gives us the bargaining power of unions
through ￿ = ￿2=(1 + ￿2).
3 The data
Our empirical analysis is based on the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, which
in the release of March 2008 provide a comprehensive and coherent dataset for most European
countries with annual statistics at industry level on hours worked by skills, net capital stock by
main assets, intermediate inputs and gross production.6 However, as data are not available with
the same level of sectoral disaggregation for all countries, we decided to work with a selection
of 15 industries belonging to the non-farm business sector in 10 European countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Spain.
Again to avoid an unbalanced panel, we restricted our analysis to the period spanning 1982-2005.
We also drew on supplementary estimates to make the dataset fully suitable for our investigation.
First, for Belgium, France and Spain data on real capital stock, gross ￿xed capital formation and
consumption of ￿xed capital, not included in the EU KLEMS dataset, were taken from the STAN-
OECD database.7 Second, for all countries the user cost of capital was estimated by multiplying the
gross ￿xed capital formation price index by the rental rate of capital, which, in turn, is measured
by the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation rate, net of the expected capital gains.8
As for the selection of sectors of activity, we did not include agriculture and mining, for which
data are missing for a large number of countries for the early years in the sample, public adminis-
tration, health care and education, where State supply play a predominant role in most European
6http://www.euklems.net/
7For Spain the consumption of ￿xed capital was also missing in the STAN-OECD database and therefore it was
calculated implicitly for each sector as CFKt = Kt￿1 ￿Kt +GFKFt, where CFK is consumption of ￿xed capital,
K is net capital stock and GFKF is gross ￿xed capital formation.
8For each sector in a given country, we have calculated the depreciation rate at time t as the contemporaneous
ratio of the consumption of ￿xed capital to the net capital stock; the expected capital gains at time t are proxied
by a moving average of three terms (t, t-1, t-2) of the rate of growth of the gross ￿xed capital formation de￿ ator.
9countries; moreover, in the public sector the concepts of pro￿t and mark-up make little sense,
given that only labour compensation and capital depreciation contribute to value added. We also
excluded housing services, which is mostly made up of imputed rents pertaining to owner-occupied
dwellings.
Equations (5) and (15) have been estimated for the entire dataset and separately for distinct
aggregates of industries, which we believe could have been a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways by the institu-
tional changes that occurred since the early nineties. In particular, we focused on manufacturing
industries (further split in high, medium-tech and traditional industries), construction, highly reg-
ulated services (energy, gas and water supply; transport, storage and communication; ￿nancial
intermediation) and other (remaining) services (Table 1). Regarding manufacturing industries,
given the importance of international trade for this sector, one could expect a sizeable impact of
the implementation of the Single Market Programme; on the other hand, since this sector was
already exposed to high levels of international competition, one could argue that there was little
room for further improvement. In regulated industries, public ownership and regulation tradition-
ally limited competitive pressure; however, several EU directives have been issued to harmonize
the regulatory framework across member countries and foster competition. Moreover, in a number
of countries privatization programmes have deeply changed their market organization. Finally,
other business services remain quite closed to international competition; the Directive on services
was subsequently passed and in a watered-down version that still awaits a full implementation.
Accordingly, the Single Market Programme is expected to play a minor role in these activities,
even if they might have been a⁄ected by the labour market reforms like the rest of the business
sector.
The empirical counterparts to the theoretical variables in equations (5) and (15) are given by
the following:9 Qt is real gross output and Pt refers to its price index; Nt is total hours worked by
employees and Wt is hourly labour compensation;10 Mt is the volume index of intermediate inputs
and Jt refers to its price index; Kt is net real ￿xed capital stock; Rt is the user cost of capital.
In a ￿rst stage, the shares of labour and intermediate inputs were calculated as ￿0
N = WN=PQ
and ￿0
M = JM=PQ, respectively; further, since we assume constant returns to scale, the capital
share was obtained as ￿0
K = (1 ￿ ￿0
N ￿ ￿0
M). Unfortunately, as outlined also in the EU KLEMS
methodology, the capital share happens to be negative in some cases. Instead of restricting the
negative values to zero, as suggested by the EU KLEMS consortium,11 since we believe it is
9The description of the variables is valid for each sector in the dataset, although for brevity we do not report a
su¢ x to identify it.
10In the EU KLEMS dataset it is assumed that, at the industry level, the compensation per hour of self-employed
is equal to the compensation per hour of employees.
11See ￿EU KLEMS Growth and productivity accounts ￿Part I Methodology￿ , page 41.
10reasonable to posit a minimum return to capital we proceeded as follows: ￿rst, we calculated
the implicit return on capital as rimp = (￿0
KPQ)=K; second, where it turns negative, rimp was
substituted with the minimum positive rimp across sectors for the same year and country; third,
the ￿nal adjusted capital share was calculated as ￿K = (rimp￿PQ)=K and, on the assumption that
the sign inconvenience described above was due to an improper measurement of the intermediate
inputs, the ￿nally adjusted share of the latter was obtained as ￿M = (1 ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿N), with an
unchanged labour share ￿N = ￿0
N.
1986-90 2001-05 1986-90 2001-05 1986-90 2001-05 1986-90 2001-05 1986-90 2001-05
1 Food, beverages and tobacco 8.42 5.85 4.04 3.44 8.34 8.95 15.14 16.81 76.5 74.24
2 Textile, leather and footwear 3.28 1.79 4.09 1.95 8.55 7.03 27.51 25.26 63.93 67.71
3 Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 3.63 2.84 2.75 2.22 11.97 12.54 26.19 24.49 61.84 62.97
4 Chemical, rubber and plastics 8.13 7.49 3.71 2.89 12.89 11.66 17.63 15.29 69.47 73.05
5 Basic metals and fabricated metal 6.06 4.76 4.84 4.01 10.8 8.72 24.98 24.81 64.21 66.47
6 Machinery, n.e.c. 4.65 3.98 3.83 2.89 10.01 8.69 29.65 26.25 60.34 65.06
7 Electrical and optical equipment 4.73 4.18 4.04 2.83 11.33 9.15 30.21 23.79 58.45 67.06
8 Transport equipment 4.86 5.32 3.06 2.35 6.28 5.87 23.5 17.92 70.22 76.21
9 Electricity, gas and water supply 3.55 3.19 1.34 0.89 30.51 28.81 17.94 13.15 51.55 58.04
10 Construction 10.53 9.81 12.19 12.15 8.86 8.66 32.09 31.13 59.05 60.21
11 Wholesale and retail trade 14.54 15.06 24.21 23.69 13.98 15.01 43.67 38.06 42.35 46.93
12 Hotels and restaurants 3.21 3.78 6.24 7.66 7.04 9.18 41.15 39.78 51.81 51.04
13 Transport, storage and communication 9.07 11.22 10.12 9.83 17.99 18.68 36.64 26.96 45.37 54.36
14 Financial intermediation 6.3 7.07 4.89 4.59 20.41 22.42 40.27 30.61 39.32 46.97
15 Renting of m.&eq. and other business activities 9.07 13.65 10.61 18.62 13.59 12.96 43.26 43.34 43.15 43.7
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .
1 to 8 Manufacturing 43.76 36.21 30.38 22.56 10.02 9.08 24.35 21.83 65.63 69.09
9, 13, 14 Regulated Services 18.92 21.48 1.34 0.89 30.51 28.81 17.93 13.15 51.56 58.04
11, 12, 15 Other Services 26.72 31.95 36.97 42.65 13.64 14.48 39.51 34.98 46.85 50.54
Aggregations:
Shares on total gross
production
Shares on total worked
hours
Factor shares on industry gross production
Capital Labour Intermediate Industries
Table 1 - Main features of industries included in the analysis; percentage values
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the industries considered in the analysis, featuring
the main changes between the years preceding the completion of the Single Market Programme and
the ￿nal period in our sample. Besides the declining shares of hours worked in most manufacturing
industries, in contrast with the rise in services, it is worth mentioning that the widespread fall in
the labour shares of gross production was accompanied by a surge in those of intermediate inputs.
4 Estimates for changing structural parameters
In this section we describe our estimation strategy and main ￿ndings. Special attention was devoted
to looking for possible structural breaks on both the mark-up ￿ and the unions￿bargaining power
￿ at some date between the late eighties (when the Single Market Programme was ￿rst announced)
11and the mid-nineties (when it was formally completed). For this purpose, the simplest approach is
to assume that the supposed regime shift was instantaneous, so that it can be modelled as a level
shift in the modi￿ed Roeger equation (15):12
NSRit = ￿0 + ￿1XMARKit + ￿2V BARGit +
+￿3D
TM
t XMARKit + ￿4D
TB
t V BARGit + uit (16)
where D
Th
t takes value 0 for t < Th and 1 for t > Th (h = M;B), with Th being the timing
of the break, which is allowed to di⁄er between the mark-up and the bargaining power; index
i orders observations by sector-country. If the standard t-test on b ￿3 and b ￿4 rejects the null
of no signi￿cance, the value of the structural parameters before and after the breaks would be
respectively obtained as: b ￿t<TM = 1=(1 ￿ b ￿1), b ￿t<TB = b ￿2=(1 + b ￿2) and b ￿t>TM = 1=(1 ￿ b ￿1 ￿ b ￿3),
b ￿t>TB = (b ￿2 + b ￿4)=(1 + b ￿2 + b ￿4). On the contrary, were the shift coe¢ cients not statistically
di⁄erent from zero, there would be no change in the two parameters for t > Th.
In spite of the simplicity of this approach, the assumption of an instantaneous regime shift
may sound very restrictive. On the one hand, rational economic agents possibly anticipated the
e⁄ects of the Single market Programme, on the other the adjustment of the institutional setting
in each country possibly took some time to be completed. In this respect, as stressed in Badinger
(2007), the speci￿cation of a continuous regime shift may be preferable, at least as a preliminary
step, in order to check the degree of approximation that the linear model (16) would impose. As
a consequence, in a ￿rst step we followed Badinger and introduced a smooth transition function
interacted with both XMARK and V BARG:
NSRit = ￿0 + ￿1XMARKit + ￿2V BARGit +
+￿3F
M(t)XMARKit + ￿4F
B(t)V BARGit + uit (17)
where F h(t) = 1=[1 + e￿￿(t￿￿h)] are symmetric logistic functions mapping time t onto the interval
(0;1), with h = M; B. The slope of F h(t) is determined by the parameter ￿: the lower its
estimated value, the smoother the function and the stronger the evidence in favour of a continuous
regime change (on the contrary, the higher is ￿, the steeper the function and the more plausible
the approximation of a discrete shift). For the sake of simplicity, the speed of transition has been
imposed to be the same for both the product and the labour market. The parameters ￿h represent
the regime transition mid-points to be estimated jointly with the other coe¢ cients, instead of being
12An instantaneous regime change is adopted by Allen et al. (1998), Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Sauner-Leroy
(2003).
12imposed exogenously as in (16).13
Equation (17) has been estimated through non-linear least squares (detailed results in Appendix
II), con￿rming the evidence found in Badinger (2007) of very high values for ￿. More speci￿cally,
the speed of transition validates an instantaneous break in most of the largest industrial sectors
(manufacturing, construction and non-regulated ￿"Other" ￿services); as for the total dataset and
the regulated services, the value of ￿ proves relatively smaller. All in all, the simpler option of
discrete breaks, equation (16), turns out to be a plausible approximation. As for the dating, we
retained the break years endogenously selected as transition mid-points when we estimated (17),
and we accordingly set the shift dummies D
Th
t ; we maintained some limited degree of ￿ exibility
just in the choice of the breaks years where we found evidence of a slightly lower speed of transition
(total dataset and regulated services).
4.1 Results at the aggregate level
The modi￿ed Roeger equation (16) was estimated through OLS with country-sector ￿xed e⁄ects.
First we concentrated on the total dataset, exploiting all sample variations over time; then we
looked at the evidence for main industries.
In order to check for endogeneity problems potentially coming from measurement errors, we
performed GMM estimates (in system speci￿cation), ￿nding results invariably in line with the OLS
counterparts (Appendix II).
Starting with the total dataset, in the Columns A to D of Table 3 we report as a benchmark
the results that we obtained by setting the break at year 1993, just after the restrictions on the
free circulation of goods and factors across the EU were de￿nitively removed. Column E describes
our favourite model (though results are quite similar), where the level shift was postponed to 1994
in line with our estimates of the non-linear equation (17) (Table AII.1 in Appendix II).
In line with the received empirical evidence mostly based on Hall￿ s approach, in our frame-
work the assumption of e¢ cient bargaining signi￿cantly raises the estimated size of the mark-up.
Speci￿cally, it appears to be 15 per cent higher when estimated by explicitly controlling for rent
allocation (columns A and C in Table 3 and Table AIII.1 in Appendix III).14 Indeed, rents prove
reasonably larger when they are measured ex ante, before a share of them is distributed to workers.
13As Badinger outlined, equation (16) is nested in equation (17) that collapses into a linear model with an
instantaneous break at ￿ = t when ￿ ! 1.
14Standard errors for structural parameters reported in the tables are computed according to the delta-method.
In general, when the reduced form parameter is statistically signi￿cant, the structural parameter is signi￿cant as
well. The same holds true for tests on strutural breaks.
13(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
XMARK 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.31*** XMARK 0.31***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
VBARG - - 0.17*** 0.24*** VBARG 0.24***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
XMARK*D93 - 0.05* - -0.04 XMARK*D94 -0.05
(0.026) (0.036) (0.037)
VBARG*D93 - - - -0.15*** VBARG*D94 -0.16***
(0.056) (0.058)
1.22 1.19 1.40 1.45 1.46
(0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.043) (0.041)
1.22 1.27
† † 1.40 1.37 1.36
(0.019) (0.031) (0.036) (0.055) (0.058)
- - 0.14 0.19 0.20
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019)
- - 0.14 0.08
† † † 0.07
† † †
(0.023) (0.040) (0.042)
R-sq. 0.569 0.578 0.595 0.610 R-sq. 0.611
F-stat. 25.54 26.50 37.56 36.07 F-stat. 36.26
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Prob>F 0.00
No. Obs. 3776 3776 3776 3776 No. Obs. 3776
Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates
with country-sector fixed effects; robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the
difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † † significant at 1%,
† †
significant at 5%,




Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
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Table 3 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: total dataset
Exploiting the time coverage of our dataset, larger than in previous contributions, when we do
not control for rent reallocation we ￿nd evidence of a positive structural break in mark-ups (of 4-5
per cent;columns A and B in Tables 3 and AIII.1), which would entail an unexpected reduction in
competitive pressures following the implementation of Single Market Programme. However, the
impact on mark-ups turns negative, though it is not signi￿cant, when the companion adjustments
on the labour market are considered too. Indeed, we ￿nd a strong evidence for a structural break
in the rent share distributed to workers, which fell by half from 1993-94 on (columns D and E in
14Tables 3 and AIII.1).
Regressions meet the usual diagnostic checks; results prove robust across estimation meth-
ods and controlling for non-spherical errors due to the endogeneity issues raised in Hylleberg and
Jorgensen (1998).15 Moreover, as a robustness check we dropped, in turn, each of the countries
included in the dataset: outcomes remained almost unchanged, irrespective of the sample com-
position. The same evidence broadly emerged also when we concentrated only on the subset of
countries belonging to the euro area, as reported in Tables AIII.2 and AIII.3 in Appendix III.16
Tentatively, considering the remaining possible measurement issues, it follows that con￿ning
attention to the product market may result in the missing of important ingredients in the appraisal
of both the extent and the transmission channel of the competitive impulse exerted by the Single
Market Programme. Our evidence suggests that institutional changes have mainly a⁄ected the
equilibrium on the labour market through a reduction in workers￿bargaining power, while the
impact on the pricing rules in the product market is more controversial. Even if we assume that
the total amount of rents tends to decrease, ￿rms￿pro￿t margins could well remain unchanged or
even increase due to the fall in the share of rents distributed to workers.
We believe that the result does not stem only from the Single Market Programme, whose
implementation came hand in hand with broader innovation in the institutional and productive
set-up that was spurred in part by privatization and increasing globalization. In order to inves-
tigate in more detail this ￿rst set of results, we grouped our countries according to the intensity
of the regulatory changes since the beginning of the nineties. For this purpose, we adopted the
OECD indicators regarding employment protection legislation (EPL) and product market regula-
tion (PMR).
15In each regression we added a country-speci￿c output gap measure to control for aggregate cyclical e⁄ects that
are not captured by the coe¢ cients of the time dummies estimated for the whole sample. However results did not
change when the output gap variable was not included.
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Figure 2 - OECD indicators of changes in employment protection legislation (EPL) and product
market regulation (PMR)
Figure 2 shows that the total sample can be split quite clearly into two groups, one (lower
left area of the graph) made up of countries that underwent a sizeable reduction in both product
and labour market regulations (Italy, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain),
the other (upper right area) comprising countries characterized by less pronounced deregulation
(Austria and Finland), France, with persistently high labour market protection, and the UK,
which endorsed signi￿cant reforms before the implementation of the Single Market Programme.
Estimating the modi￿ed Roeger equation (16) separately for the two subgroups, we ￿nd that the
outcomes just described for the total dataset are driven exclusively by the "recently reformed"
countries, which since the mid-nineties have registered a signi￿cant decline both in mark-ups and
in the share of rent distributed to workers (Table 4 and Table AIII.4 in Appendix III). We interpret
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Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with
country-sector fixed effects; robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference
between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
† significant at 10%. (1) Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark. (2) United
Kingdom, France, Austria, Finland.
94 ˆ< t m





Table 4 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: recently reformed and other countries
4.2 Results at the industry level
In order to investigate the main drivers of the aggregate results, we tested for structural breaks
for selected sectors. For industry (further split into manufacturing and construction), in the left
17panel of Table 5 we report the estimates based on 1994 as a break year, which is the same option
chosen for the total dataset; in the right panlel the regime change has been set at the transition
mid-points endogenously selected through the estimation of equation (17).
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Manuf. Manuf. Constr. Constr. Manuf. Constr.
XMARK 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.06*** 0.20*** XMARK 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.020) (0.054) (0.012) (0.042)
VBARG - 0.16*** - 0.22*** VBARG 0.17*** 0.22***
(0.022) (0.075) (0.018) (0.051)
XMARK*D94 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 XMARK*DT
M -0.06*** -0.08***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.031) (0.072) (0.017) (0.033)
VBARG*D94 - -0.05* - -0.06 VBARG*DT
B -0.09*** -0.14***
(0.030) (0.103) (0.023) (0.052)
1.11 1.25 1.06 1.25 1.26 1.26
(0.009) (0.024) (0.022) (0.083) (0.019) (0.066)
1.12 1.22 1.01
† 1.14 1.17
† † † 1.14
†
(0.009) (0.021) (0.024) (0.064) (0.021) (0.046)
- 0.13 - 0.18 0.14 0.18
(0.017) (0.050) (0.013) (0.034)
- 0.10
† - 0.14 0.07
† † † 0.07
† †
(0.016) (0.055) (0.018) (0.055)
R-sq. 0.486 0.535 0.267 0.344 R-sq. 0.543 0.385
F-stat. 29.80 34.99 3.43 4.49 F-stat. 35.07 4.07
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Prob>F 0.00 0.00
No. Obs. 1893 1893 240 240 No. Obs. 1893 240
Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with country-sector fixed effects; robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural
parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
†
significant at 10%. T
M is equal to 1999 for Manufacturing and to 1993 for Construction; T





Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
94 ˆ ‡ t m





M T t< m ˆ
M T t‡ m ˆ
B T t< f ˆ
B T t‡ f ˆ
Table 5 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: industry
In this sector the regime shift may have taken place in the second half of the nineties, with
some asynchrony between the product and the labour market. Again, when changes in the labour
18market are not controlled for, there is no evidence of any signi￿cant break in the product market
(left panel of Table 5 and Table AIII.5 in Appendix III); on the contrary, once e¢ cient bargaining
is allowed for and break years are properly selected, outcomes point to a signi￿cant decrease in
mark-up and union bargaining power (right panel of Tables 5 and AIII.5).
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Regul. Regul. Others Others Regul. Others
XMARK 0.25*** 0.37*** 0.17*** 0.39*** XMARK 0.36*** 0.39***
(0.017) (0.039) (0.013) (0.047) (0.033) (0.044)
VBARG - 0.21*** - 0.38*** VBARG 0.20*** 0.38***
(0.067) (0.083) (0.055) (0.077)
XMARK*D94 0.08*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.00 XMARK*DT
M 0.01 0.00
(0.030) (0.083) (0.019) (0.085) (0.029) (0.060)
VBARG*D94 - -0.16 - 0.07 VBARG*DT
B -0.16*** 0.07
(0.123) (0.144) (0.046) (0.102)
1.33 1.58 1.21 1.64 1.57 1.64
(0.031) (0.097) (0.019) (0.126) (0.082) (0.118)
1.49
† † † 1.56 1.15
† † 1.64 1.60 1.64
(0.053) (0.174) (0.018) (0.199) (0.108) (0.160)
- 0.17 - 0.28 0.17 0.28
(0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.040)
- 0.04 - 0.31 0.04
† † 0.31
(0.094) (0.058) (0.061) (0.047)
R-sq. 0.804 0.814 0.546 0.659 R-sq. 0.821 0.659
F-stat. 32.09 29.07 16.32 21.75 F-stat. 34.36 21.50
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Prob>F 0.00 0.00
No. Obs. 720 720 923 923 No. Obs. 720 923
Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with country-sector fixed effects; robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural
parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
†
significant at 10%. T
M is equal to 1994 for both Regulated and Other services; T
B is equal to 1996 for Regulated services and to 1995
for Other services.
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M T t< m ˆ
M T t‡ m ˆ
B T t< f ˆ
B T t‡ f ˆ
Table 6 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: services
By disaggregating further the manufacturing sector, signi￿cant and sizeable shifts in para-
meters are detected in medium and high-tech industries, grouped in the two aggregates "Paper,
chemicals, plastics and metals" and "Machinery, electrical and transport equipment". Both sub-
groups experienced a reduction in mark-ups and union bargaining power (Tables AIII.7 and AIII.8
19in Appendix III); on the contrary, traditional industries such as "Food, beverages, textiles and
leather" do not show statistical evidence of a regime change.
In the service sector, without controlling for imperfect labour markets we ￿nd a signi￿cant rise
in mark-ups in regulated industries (by more than 10 per cent) and a decline in other services
(by around 5 per cent; left panel in Table 6 and Table AIII.6 in Appendix III). However, when
rent sharing is taken into account, the shift becomes statistically insigni￿cant in both groups of
activities, and we ￿nd strong evidence of a drop in bargaining power only in the sole regulated
sectors (right panel in Tables 6 and AIII.6 in Appendix III). This is consistent with results in
Torrini (2005) and Azmat et al. (2007), showing that the main outcome of privatizations and
changes in regulation in some sectors, notably in network industries, was a reallocation of rents -
from labour to capital - rather than a reduction in their amount. This would be due to either a
shift in the managers￿objectives from politically related targets to pro￿t maximization or a decline
in union power after ownership is transferred from the government to private shareholders.
Summing up, in manufacturing and construction there is clear evidence of a reduction in both
mark-ups and workers rent shares around the mid-nineties; in highly regulated industries, mark-
ups remained roughly unchanged while workers￿bargaining power declined signi￿cantly; in other
business services, both mark-ups and rent sharing remained virtually unchanged.
5 Concluding remarks
We investigate the extent to which the EU Single Market Programme has a⁄ected ￿rms mark-
ups over marginal costs. Since the Programme went hand in hand with structural reforms in the
labour market and in the institutional setting of important industries (i.e. network industries), we
control for a simultaneous break in the mark-ups and rent sharing between capital and workers by
encompassing the hypothesis of e¢ cient bargaining in the labour market both in the theoretical
and in the empirical model. Using industry data for ten EU countries, at the aggregate level we
￿nd that the mark-up tended to increase in the nineties when we do not control for rent sharing.
However, once we assume e¢ cient bargaining in the labour market, the mark-up remain virtually
unchanged while the share of rents accruing to workers declined. Disregarding the fall in the
unions￿bargaining power, a rise in ￿rms￿pro￿tability due to rent reallocation could be wrongly
interpreted as a reduction in competitive pressures in the product markets. At the sector level, the
evidence proves particularly clear for manufacturing, construction and highly regulated industries,
which went through deep institutional changes and privatization programmes. Our ￿ndings of
both a sustained di⁄erence between prices and marginal costs on the product markets and a
20declining hedge between wages and labour productivity have further implications for the correct
measurement of total factor productivity under imperfect markets. In our research agenda, we
plan to undertake TFP estimation by explicitly taking into account our estimates of the mark-ups
and unions￿bargaining power in order to make the Solow residual a closer proxy for disembodied
technical progress.
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23Appendix I
Hall￿ s standard model. The basic equation in growth accounting is the following:17
￿q = "Q;N￿n + "Q;M￿m + "Q;K￿k + ￿e (A.1)
where q is the log of gross output, n is the log of labour input, m is the log of intermediate inputs,
k is the log of capital input, ￿e is technical progress, and the parameters "Q;f (f = N; M; K)
represent output elasticities with respect to labour, intermediate and capital inputs. Under the
assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the output elasticities are just
the input shares of total output. With imperfect competition these elasticities are given by the
product of input shares and the mark-up term. This can be easily seen by expressing the marginal
cost in the following way:
x =
W￿N + R￿K + J￿M
￿Q ￿ ￿eQ
(A.2)
where W, R and J are, respectively, the price of labour, capital and intermediate goods. This can





























￿k + ￿e (A.4)
Since the mark up ￿ is equal to P=x (that is output price over marginal cost), we obtain:
￿q = ￿￿N￿n + ￿￿M￿m + ￿￿K￿k + ￿e (A.5)
where ￿f are the input shares of output (f = N; M; K).
As shown in section 2, assuming constant returns to scale this can be rearranged as:
￿q = ￿￿N￿n + ￿￿M￿m + (1 ￿ ￿￿N ￿ ￿￿M)￿k + ￿e (A.6)
Rede￿ning ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ B), we obtain:
￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k = B(￿q ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ B)￿e (A.7)
17Time subscripts dropped for simplicity.
24which gives a decomposition (right hand side) of the standard Solow residual (the left hand side).
This equation can be estimated to retrieve B and therefore ￿. However, given that the e¢ ciency
term (1￿B)￿e is not observable, instrumental variables are required to obtain consistent estimates.
Roeger￿ s standard model. Roeger (1995) combines the primal and the dual solution to the ￿rm￿ s
program to get rid of the unobservables. Starting from cost minimization, price variation can be
expressed as:
￿p = "Q;N￿w + "Q;M￿j + (1 ￿ "Q;N ￿ "Q;M)￿r ￿ ￿e (A.8)













)￿r ￿ ￿e (A.9)
where C is the total cost, WN and JM are the cost of labour and intermediate inputs. Cost shares
represent both the output elasticities with respect to inputs and the cost and price elasticities with
respect to the price of inputs. With perfect competition, for each production factor output share
and cost share coincide; with imperfect competition, cost shares can be expressed as the product


























)￿r ￿ ￿e (A.10)
Rearranging we obtain:
￿p ￿ ￿N￿w ￿ ￿M￿j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿r = B(￿p ￿ ￿r) ￿ (1 ￿ B)￿e (A.11)
This can be used to substitute for (1 ￿ B)￿e in equation (7) to get:
[￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k] + [￿p ￿ ￿N￿w ￿ ￿M￿j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿r]
(A.12)
= B[(￿q ￿ ￿k) + (￿p ￿ ￿r)] (18)
As outlined in section 2, this equation, unlike Hall￿ s, can be estimated through OLS, with the
possibility of expressing all the variables in nominal terms, once a suitable user cost of capital is
25computed; in fact, rearranging:
(￿q + ￿p) ￿ ￿N (￿n + ￿w) ￿ ￿M (￿m + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)(￿k + ￿r) (A.13)
= B[(￿q + ￿p) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] (19)
where (￿q + ￿p), (￿n + ￿w), (￿m + ￿j) and (￿k + ￿r) represent, respectively, the growth rate
of nominal output and of nominal inputs compensation.
Hall￿ s and Roeger￿models with e¢ cient bargaining. As shown in the main text, by assuming
that ￿rms and workers take other factors of production as given and choose W and N by solving
a standard e¢ cient bargaining problem, the elasticities of output with respect to inputs become














1￿￿ and using (A.16) to substitute for output elasticities in equation (A.1), we get
the modi￿ed version of Hall￿ s equation adopted by Dobbelaere (2004) and Abraham et al. (2009):
￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k (A.17)
= B(￿q ￿ ￿k) + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)(￿n ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ B)￿e (20)
In order to get a correspondingly modi￿ed Roeger model, we can now substitute (A.16) in
equation (A.8), obtaining a new version of equation (A.11):
￿p ￿ ￿N￿w ￿ ￿M￿j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿r (A.18)
= B(￿p ￿ ￿r) + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)(￿w ￿ ￿r) ￿ (1 ￿ B)￿e (21)
Finally, combining equations (A.17) and (A.18) we obtain the modi￿ed version of Roeger￿ s equa-
tion:
[￿q ￿ ￿N￿n ￿ ￿M￿m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿k] + [￿p ￿ ￿N￿w ￿ ￿M￿j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)￿r]
(A.19)
= B[(￿q ￿ ￿k) + (￿p ￿ ￿r)] + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)(￿n ￿ ￿k + ￿w ￿ ￿r) (22)
26Rearranging it can be written as:
(￿q + ￿p) ￿ ￿N(￿n + ￿w) ￿ ￿M(￿m + ￿j) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿M)(￿k + ￿r) (A.20)
= B[(￿q + ￿p) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] + ￿(￿N ￿ 1)[(￿n + ￿w) ￿ (￿k + ￿r)] (23)
which is equation (14) in the main text.
27Appendix II
The modi￿ed Roeger equation reads:
NSRit = ￿0 + ￿1XMARKit + ￿2V BARGit +
+￿3F
M(t)XMARKit + ￿4F
B(t)V BARGit + uit
where F h(t) = 1=(1 + e￿￿(t￿￿h)), with h = M; B, has been estimated through non-linear least
squares.18 In order to prevent non-convergence in the estimation process, we followed Badinger
(2007) and ran a grid search setting the parameter ￿ from the outset, starting from the value of 0:2
(a very smooth transition) and reaching 10 (a very steep shape, approximating a discrete regime
shift), with a step increase of 0:01. At each step, we stored the non-linear least squares estimates of
the remaining parameters, together with the sum of squared residuals (RSS), and eventually chose
the parameter estimates and the value of ￿ corresponding to the minimum RSS, once implausible
outcomes, as a result of the convergence process, were discarded.
XMARK 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.44***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
VBARG 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.46***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
F
M(t)*XMARK -0.07* -0.08*** -0.07* -0.01 -0.10
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
F
B(t)*VBARG -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.20* -0.09
(0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.14)
2.13 9.94 9.97 1.32 6.90
1997.4 1998.8 1992.8 1995.6 1990.1
1997.3 1997.1 1998.0 1996.1 1990.6
R-sq. 0.600 0.527 0.319 0.810 0.650
No. Obs. 3776 1893 240 720 923
Manufacturing Total dataset






Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (17)
Notes: economy wide output gap is included as regressor. Non linear least squares estimates; robust standard




Table AII.1 - non linear least squares estimates of the model with smooth transition functions
18The starting values of the coe¢ cients ￿1and ￿2 were set equal to the corresponding least squares estimates of
the linear model without any regime change (i.e. imposing ￿3 = ￿4 = 0); the starting value of ￿0 was set at 1,
while those of ￿3 and ￿4 were set at 0. The timing of the shifts ￿h (h = M; B) was initially set at 1993.
28In Table AII.1, besides the ￿￿ s coe¢ cients for XMARK, XBARG and their relative smooth
transition variables, we report the estimated transition mid-points ￿h (h = M;B) and the value of
￿ minimizing RSS as the outcome of the grid search. The value of ￿ has been selected among those
implying transition mid-points falling between the end of the eighties and the end of the nineties,
that is, the time range in which the actual regime shift towards the Single Market Programme
settings most plausibly took place.
29Appendix III
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
XMARK 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.29*** XMARK 0.30***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
VBARG - - 0.16*** 0.23*** VBARG 0.23***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
XMARK*D93 - 0.06 - -0.02 XMARK*D94 -0.04
(0.037) (0.051) (0.048)
VBARG*D93 - - - -0.13** VBARG*D94 -0.15**
(0.062) (0.062)
1.21 1.18 1.37 1.41 1.42
(0.033) (0.031) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057)
1.21 1.27
† † 1.37 1.37 1.35
(0.033) (0.036) (0.056) (0.093) (0.090)
- - 0.14 0.19 0.19
(0.031) (0.027) (0.026)




wald chi2 (df) 399.62 (25) 407.89 (26) 608.12 (26) 578.67 (28) wald chi2 (df) 578.04 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00
Hansen test (df) 138.69 (322) 145.59 (322) 140.45 (645) 132.21 (645) Hansen test (df) 126.08 (645)
P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 P-value 1.00
AR(1) -3.830 -4.360 -3.780 -4.300 AR(1) -4.270
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00
AR(2) 1.32 1.34 1.30 1.29 AR(2) 1.33
P-value 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 P-value 0.18
No. Obs. 3776 3776 3776 3776 No. Obs. 3776
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available lags. Time dummies
and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates
before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
† significant at 10%. AR(1) and AR(2):
Arellano-Bond tests for, respectively, first and second order correlation in first differences.
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Table AIII.1 - GMM estimates: total dataset
30(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
XMARK 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.29*** XMARK 0.30***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
VBARG - - 0.17*** 0.22*** VBARG 0.23***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.030)
XMARK*D93 - 0.07*** - 0.02 XMARK*D94 0.01
(0.024) (0.036) (0.036)
VBARG*D93 - - - -0.08* VBARG*D94 -0.09**
(0.047) (0.047)
1.24 1.19 1.42 1.41 1.43
(0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.042) (0.041)
1.24 1.29
† † † 1.42 1.46 1.45
(0.020) (0.023) (0.033) (0.061) (0.066)
- - 0.15 0.18 0.19
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020)




R-sq. 0.590 0.606 0.620 0.640 R-sq. 0.639
F-stat. 31.89 32.07 40.40 38.55 F-stat. 38.27
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Prob>F 0.00
No. Obs. 3008 3008 3008 3008 No. Obs. 3008
Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with
country-sector fixed effects; robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the
difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † † significant at 1%,
† †
significant at 5%,
† significant at 10%.
Diagnostics
Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
Regressors' coefficients
Estimated structural parameters
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Table AIII.2 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: euro area
31(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
XMARK 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.28*** 0.28*** XMARK 0.28***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
VBARG - - 0.17*** 0.20*** VBARG 0.21***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.044)
XMARK*D93 - 0.07** - 0.04 XMARK*D94 0.02
(0.035) (0.055) (0.047)
VBARG*D93 - - - -0.06 VBARG*D94 -0.08*
(0.051) (0.048)
1.22 1.18 1.40 1.38 1.40
(0.037) (0.026) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
1.22 1.29
† † † 1.40 1.46 1.45
(0.037) (0.026) (0.060) (0.114) (0.109)
- - 0.14 0.17 0.18
(0.024) (0.031) (0.030)
- - 0.14 0.12 0.12
†
(0.024) (0.031) (0.032)
wald chi2 (df) 649.16 (25) 625.17 (26) 814.39 (26) 839.97 (28) wald chi2 (df) 821.05 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00
Hansen test (df) 113.66 (322) 105.01 (322) 110.65 (645) 106.37 (645) Hansen test (df) 112.05 (645)
P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 P-value 1.00
AR(1) -3.020 -3.420 -3.060 -3.560 AR(1) -3.510
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00
AR(2) 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 AR(2) 0.90
P-value 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 P-value 0.37
No. Obs 3008 3008 3008 3008 Nobs 3008
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available lags. Time dummies
and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates
before and after the time breaks) is:
† † † significant at 1%,
† † significant at 5%,
† significant at 10%. AR(1) and AR(2):
Arellano-Bond tests for, respectively, first and second order correlation in first differences.
Diagnostics
Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
Regressors' coefficients
Estimated structural parameters
93 ˆ < t m
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wald chi2 (df) 488.48 (28) 545.78 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00










Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available lags.
Time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the
structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †
significant at 1%,
† † significant at 5%,
† significant at 10%. AR(1) and AR(2): Arellano-Bond tests for,
respectively, first and second order correlation in first differences. (1) Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium,
Netherlands, Denmark.  (2) United Kingdom, France, Austria, Finland.
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Table AIII.4 - GMM estimates: recently reformed and other countries
33(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Manuf. Manuf. Constr. Constr. Manuf. Constr.
XMARK 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.06*** 0.18*** XMARK 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.057) (0.019) (0.054)
VBARG - 0.14*** - 0.18** VBARG 0.15*** 0.20**
(0.029) (0.083) (0.027) (0.084)
XMARK*D94 0.02 -0.00 -0.04** -0.04 XMARK*DT
M -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.035) (0.017) (0.018)
VBARG*D94 - -0.03 - -0.01 VBARG*DT
B -0.08*** -0.14***
(0.030) (0.061) (0.026) (0.027)
1.10 1.21 1.07 1.21 1.23 1.24
(0.012) (0.031) (0.026) (0.083) (0.029) (0.083)
1.12 1.21 1.02
† † 1.15 1.16
† † 1.13
(0.013) (0.027) (0.023) (0.091) (0.025) (0.078)
- 0.12 - 0.15 0.13 0.16
(0.023) (0.060) (0.020) (0.059)
- 0.10 - 0.14 0.07
† † 0.05
(0.022) (0.077) (0.024) (0.089)
wald chi2 (df) 794.27 (26) 1263.57 (28) 129.11 (26) 1065.50 (28) wald chi2 (df) 1268.20 (28) 221.99 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00 0.00
Hansen test (df) 60.89 (322) 62.97 (645) 0 (187) 0 (205) Hansen test (df) 58.17 (645) 0 (205)
P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 P-value 1.00 1.00
AR(1) -4.340 -4.250 -2.660 -2.590 AR(1) -4.280 -2.640
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 P-value 0.00 0.01
AR(2) -0.26 -0.27 -0.50 -0.56 AR(2) -0.07 -0.05
P-value 0.80 0.79 0.62 0.58 P-value 0.95 0.96
No. Obs. 1893 1893 240 240 No. Obs. 1893 240
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available lags. Time dummies and economy
wide output gap are included as regressors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks)
is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
†significant at 10%. AR(1) and AR(2): Arellano-Bond tests for, respectively, first and
second order correlation in first differences. T
M is equal to 1999 for Manufacturing and to 1993 for Construction; T
B is equal to 1997 for




Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
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M T t< m ˆ
B T t‡ f ˆ
M T t‡ m ˆ
B T t< f ˆ
Table AIII.5 - GMM estimates: industry
34(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Regul. Regul. Others Others Regul. Others
XMARK 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.17*** 0.38*** XMARK 0.36*** 0.38***
(0.021) (0.041) (0.019) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041)
VBARG - 0.20** - 0.36*** VBARG 0.19** 0.37***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.073)
XMARK*D94 0.08*** 0.00 -0.04* 0.02 XMARK*DT
M 0.02 0.02
(0.024) (0.085) (0.023) (0.087) (0.022) (0.062)
VBARG*D94 - -0.15 - 0.11 VBARG*DT
B -0.15*** 0.10
(0.140) (0.141) (0.035) (0.099)
1.32 1.56 1.21 1.61 1.55 1.61
(0.037) (0.098) (0.027) (0.114) (0.103) (0.106)
1.49
† † † 1.57 1.15
† 1.67 1.61 1.66
(0.046) (0.206) (0.025) (0.219) (0.130) (0.177)
- 0.16 - 0.27 0.16 0.27
(0.054) (0.042) (0.055) (0.039)
- 0.05 - 0.32 0.04
† 0.32
(0.122) (0.061) (0.073) (0.051)
wald chi2 (df) 6395.63 (26) 27640.06 (28) 667.42 (26) 1547.90 (28) wald chi2 (df) 92963.66 (28) 1546.70 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00 0.00
Hansen test (df) 3.72 (322) 3.05 (526) 9.23 (322) 9.50 (606) Hansen test (df) 3.47 (526) 8.85 (606)
P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 P-value 1.00 1.00
AR(1) -2.630 -2.700 -3.950 -3.710 AR(1) -3.150 -3.670
P-value 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 P-value 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.80 0.78 -0.72 0.50 AR(2) 0.64 0.49
P-value 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.62 P-value 0.53 0.63
No. Obs. 720 720 923 923 No. Obs. 720 923
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available lags. Time dummies and economy wide output
gap are included as regressors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level
shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at
5%,
†significant at 10%. AR(1) and AR(2): Arellano-Bond tests for, respectively, first and second order correlation in first differences. T
M is equal
to 1994 for both Regulated and Other services; T
B is equal to 1996 for Regulated services and to 1995 for Other services.
Estimated structural parameters
Diagnostics
Dependent variable: nominal Solow residual, or NSR in (16)
Regressors' coefficients
94 ˆ < t m





M T t< m ˆ
M T t‡ m ˆ
B T t‡ f ˆ
B T t< f ˆ
Table AIII.6 - GMM estimates: services
35Food, bever., Paper, chemic., Mach., electr.
text. and leath.
1 plast. and metals
2 and transp. equip.
3
XMARK 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.28***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
VBARG 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.29***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029)
XMARK*D99 0.00 -0.05** -0.10***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)











† † † 0.14
† † †
(0.021) (0.028) (0.023)
R-sq. 0.585 0.656 0.529
F-stat. 17.56 22.03 18.80
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. Obs. 480 714 699
Notes: time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with
country-sector fixed effects; robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the
estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
†significant at
10%. (1) Food, beverages and tobacco; Textiles, leather and footwear. (2) Pulp, paper, printing and
publishing; Chemicals, rubber, plastics and fuel; Basic metals and fabricated metals. (3) Machinery,
n.e.c.; Electrical  and  optical equipment; Transport equipment.
Regressors' coefficients
Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
Diagnostics
Estimated structural parameters
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Table AIII.7 - Fixed e⁄ects OLS estimates: low, medium and high tech industrial sectors
36Food, bever., Paper, chemic., Mach., electr.
text. and leath.
1 plast. and metals
2 and transp. equip.
3
XMARK 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.27***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.024)
VBARG 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.29***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.034)
XMARK*D99 0.01 -0.04* -0.08***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.027)













wald chi2 (df) 4399.89 (28) 15547.93 (28) 10836.09 (28)
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test (df) 0 (391) 9.96 (520) 1.28 (518)
P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(1) -3.430 -4.630 -2.710
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.01
AR(2) -0.32 -1.27 0.58
P-value 0.75 0.20 0.56
No. Obs. 480 714 699
Dependent variable: Nominal Solow Residual, or NSR in (16)
Notes: system GMM estimates with instruments given by all the regressors, exploiting all available
lags. Time dummies and economy wide output gap are included as regressors. OLS estimates with
country-sector fixed effects; robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%. The level shift of the structural parameters (i.e. the difference between the
estimates before and after the time breaks) is:
† † †significant at 1%,
† †significant at 5%,
†significant at
10%. AR(1) and AR(2): Arellano-Bond tests for, respectively, first and second order correlation in first
differences. (1) Food, beverages and tobacco; Textiles, leather and footwear. (2) Pulp, paper, printing
and publishing; Chemicals, rubber, plastics and fuel; Basic metals and fabricated metals. (3)
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